Example of an IOT Exam Answer
Below is a model ("specimen") answer to an IOT Exam question set by the Air Power Studies lecturers. This example is of a Distinction quality and would receive somewhere around 77%. It is provided as an example of what an excellent answer might look like.
Question:
How significant was air power during the North African campaign, 1940-1943?
Answer:
The use of air power in the North African campaign between 1940 and 1943 was at the same time both limited and yet influential. The nature of the warfighting environment and the logistical demands that resulted meant that whichever side secured control of the air potentially enjoyed a significant advantage over the opponent. Yet the difficulties associated with getting the most of this advantage meant that the degree of air power’s effectiveness often depended on other factors.
With its size and geography, the North African theatre was an ideal area for exploiting air power capabilities, much like Iraq in the two recent Gulf Wars. Incorporating flat and featureless terrain, a wide expanse of sea in the north, and few permanent lines of communication, it provided a true testing-ground for exponents of tri-service warfare. Both sides faced similar demands in terms of keeping operations going far from home. And both sides were heavily reliant upon vulnerable and extended lines of supply. As a result, there were many opportunities where the offensive and defensive strengths of the air arm could be employed to real advantage. Strategic decision-makers had to consider the impact of air power (both positive and negative) at all stages of campaign planning, from intelligence about the enemy to the importance of air superiority to the likely impact of air attack on the immediate fighting.
Air power played key roles in finding and striking an opponent’s weakness before, during and after major land engagements, often with critical effect. For example, each of the major Allied and Axis offensives launched during this period were in some way conditioned by the amount and type of air power to strike from land and island bases (Malta was an important example of the latter) at naval convoys, ports and harbours, supply and munitions dumps and motor transport. Similarly, the timing and success of offensives was also influenced by the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance, battlefield air interdiction and close air support once the actual fighting began, such as at Alam Halfa in August 1942.
The ability of air power to influence the wider battlespace in North Africa became more obvious as the campaign progressed. In part, this reflected the integration of air power with other services to a much more effective degree, mainly due to necessity. Close co-operation and co-ordination with ground and naval forces and signals intelligence steadily occurred and allowed for a more flexible and responsive instrument. This in turn was the product of much accumulated mutual understanding and experience, revealed by partnerships such as that between Coningham and Montgomery (even though they later fell out after D-Day). The combat pay-off became evident in April and May 1943, when Allied ground, naval and air forces effectively sealed off 175,000 Axis combatants in Tunisia. The Luftwaffe, on the other hand, never provided the Afrika Korps with very good support. Rommel apparently deserves some of the blame for this.
Even so, significant obstacles to the effective employment of air power ensured that its potential contribution to campaign success was not always excellent. In part this was a reflection of points raised earlier, especially the huge size of the theatre itself and the logistical challenges it presented at times hindering the supply, maintenance and repair of a large air component. The often fast and fluid nature of the fighting could make identification of friend from foe difficult for airmen and the provision of close air support in particular became almost impossible. Above all, air power’s true effectiveness awaited developments in technology, command and control structures, realistic doctrine and improvements in equipment. Many of these things did not emerge until 1942.
That at least some scholars considered the 1940-1943 North African campaign primarily ‘a battle for airfields’ shows the important part that air power played. But in weighing up its significance, it is important to note that such an impact was both the product of many factors and one that only emerged over time.
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