APPENDICES
(Key points Intelligence Branch, Ministry of Home Security)
There has been no case of damage which could be interpreted as a catastrophe to the industry. But there have been cases where certain factories have been severely damaged, and while the stoppage of production has been serious it has nevertheless been only a temporary setback.
Special mention should be made of the heavy Coventry raid. Had the enemy continued his attack undoubtedly the results to the aircraft industry would have been very serious.
The severe damage done to gas, water and telephone systems undoubtedly prolonged the time in which the vital factories could have come back to production had the damage to the above utility services been on a small scale.
There is another aspect that should be considered and that is that many of the subsidiary smaller firms were without their raw material supplies for some time, machinery was badly damaged and destroyed and, therefore, the individual supplies to the major factories had, to a certain extent, repercussions.
Nevertheless, as will be seen from the individual report of the raid, the manner in which the whole of Coventry stood shoulder to shoulder and faced the issue was a very remarkable achievement.
It can be stated definitely that only in a few cases has the enemy succeeded in completely destroying a factory. In the majority of cases the damage incurred has been of a slight character. In the balance of cases where damage has been substantial or even severe it had often been that the vital plant has suffered much less than the fabric of the factory. In such cases production has recommenced on a more or less limited scale within a short time and the Repairs Organisation have materially assisted in this achievement. In view of the many alternative sources of supply provided by the highly developed system of sub-contracting it can be definitely stated that enemy action cannot be regarded as serious.
Mention should be made of the indirect effects of enemy action upon production caused by the dislocation of Public Utility Services. The effect of this factor upon War Production, however, has been minimised by speedy repairs and suitably devised Priority Schemes.
Production has also naturally been affected by damage by blast to black-out systems, resulting in a certain loss of production of a temporary character.
Individual attacks, though violent in some cases, on the Shipbuilding Yards and Heavy Steel Industry have not been as numerous as might have been expected, and on the whole the level of output has been satisfactory.
The Grid system has stood up to enemy action very well. Very few of the major Power Stations and a small number of Secondary Stations have been hit and in all cases supplied have been maintained with very few cases of interruption of more than a few hours.
The result of indiscriminate bombing has naturally affected the vast network of cables which at times has caused considerable dislocation but the wide-spread ramifications of the System have enabled the effect on production to be minimised.
The Main Reservoirs and Pumping Stations have not been hit with the exception of one case in the London Area where one of the main sources of supply was seriously damaged. This had a temporary effect on the production of the new factory installations in the Area supplied.
Owing to the vulnerability of Water Mains another problem of a different character has occasionally arisen in connection with the supplies of water to the Power Services. Effective alternative measures have, however, been devised.
Only five of the really important Gas Producing Plants have been seriously affected. The effect over the large area of one of the biggest individual suppliers caused considerable inconvenience for a period of three weeks. In the second case alternative sources were brought into play and the normal position was restored within a few hours. In the third case the damage was not of a major character.
The most serious effect on gas was in the London area when the Beckton Gas Works were hit and one can state on authority that if the enemy had continued his attacks on this works the London gas supply would inevitably have been cut off for a considerable period. Actually when supply was stopped for some days, this was due to the cutting of the main trunk lines leading from the gas works. The entire gas supply comes from the works into large trunk mains which go out from the works side by side and these trunk mains carry a supply to the centre of London where it is distributed on a grid system over the City.
Since the commencement of hostilities the total storage of oil in the United Kingdom in Commercial and Premises of the Services amounts to some millions of tons, but at no time has the level of these stocks been endangered, as is proved by the fact that up to date approximately only 3% have been lost, and this small loss has been well covered by the normal ebb and flow of deliveries.
The long term policy of creating storage capacity throughout the United Kingdom has lessened the importance of a successful attack on any one Installation. Air Raids upon the London Docks while covering a wide area have had no appreciable effect on the Food Supply of the Capital. Next in importance can be cited the attacks upon the Food Warehouses in the vicinity of the Liverpool Docks where the loss sustained was also not appreciable.
Attacks on Docks and Harbours since the outbreak of enemy air activities have been numerous. Although plant and equipment of the London Docks have been damaged, at no time have the Docks and their Outer Basins been rendered unserviceable. In the Liverpool area one of the numerous Docks was seriously damaged, but even in this case the Dock Basin still remains serviceable. At Southampton extensive damage was inflicted upon one lesser important Dock.
(1) GPO (General)
The extent of indiscriminate bombing has naturally resulted in damage to the Transmission System and some Exchange Buildings. The effects of other cases of serious damage were promptly rectified by means of a Repair-System that had been organised before the war.
(2) Radio (GPO and Commercial)
A few attempts have been made against individual Stations with little success.
During the period of intensive air attacks on this country, British railways, generally speaking, have continued to maintain nearly normal services. There has been no wholesale and lengthy interruption of the main arteries of traffic in the industrial areas, so that no serious interference has been caused to the national war effort by reason of dislocation of the railway system.
Without considering the number and types of air attacks, it is difficult to produce satisfactory evidence as to how far the bombing of railways has been discriminate.
As already mentioned under the third period of this report, when preparations for invasion were believed to have been in an advanced stage it is clear that deliberate efforts were made to cut the several lines leading from the Thames to the south and south-east coast and likewise to attempt to sever railway communications in and around Liverpool.
On the other hand, a very large proportion of cases of damage to railways had undoubtedly been the result of chance and certainly many of the most effective hits from the point of view of the enemy came within this category.
1941
While many key points have been hit (many of them more than once) in the major raids, in the built-up areas the effective damage has not been serious in relation to the national war effort.
The target risks in the major towns, however, have been considerably reduced through the policy, in the first place, of placing new factories outside town areas, thus preventing the increase of congestion in major town areas; and secondly, the general dispersal of the key industries by splitting up their shops and locating them in isolated positions in various outlying districts.
The greatest losses occurred in the months of March, April and May, and accounted for a little over ¾ of the total. If the 14% loss in January is added, these four months account for 91% of the loss over the year.
The total stocks affected over the period are estimated to be 271,500 tons. Of this total only 70,590 tons were a complete loss, which can be summarised as follows:
While the greater amount of loss occurred in the London area during 1940, the Liverpool area heads the 1941 analysis with 30,590 tons; Hull, 11,200 tons; Bristol, 8,250 tons; London, 7,550 tons; Manchester, 1,400 tons; making a total of 58,990 tons. The balance of 11,600 tons was spread over many areas, the individual losses of which were of no great significance.
The concentration of stocks in port districts gives a relatively high rate of risk from damage by aerial attack and in pre-war days of 80% of the nation’s food stocks were so concentrated. By the middle of 1941 the schemes for the dispersal of stocks had reduced the percentage of concentration to about 55% and, by the end of the year, a further reduction to about 45% had been achieved.
The greatest loss for any single class of commodity was that of 38% of animal feeding-stuffs. Wheat and flour account for a further 30%, sugar 10%, and oilseeds 9%. The remaining losses are individually small and not of great importance.
Flour Mills – 7 were destroyed, of which 4 were key points and are referred to in the main body of the Report. The total capacity of these 7 mills was 52.8 tons per hour, which was about 5% of the United Kingdom capacity.
Compound and Provender Mills – 11 were destroyed, of which 3 were key points and are referred to in the main body of the Report. The annual output capacity lost was about 392,300 tons of compounds and cereal mixtures, representing about 7½% of the United Kingdom total.
Margarine and Compound Lard – 2 plants, neither of which was a key point, were lost. They produced approximately 1000 tons per week, representing but 4% of the national capacity.
Oil-Seed Crushing Mills – one, a key point which has been mentioned in the main body of the Report, was destroyed. The weekly output was 300 tons, representing 1.6% of the total United Kingdom capacity.
Starch Factories – 2 plants have been lost neither of which was a key point. Their combined output was just over 5000 tons per annum, and represented 12% of the United Kingdom capacity.
Cold Stores – 4 cold stores were destroyed, 2 of which were key points, and are referred to in the main Report. The total storage capacity amounted to 519,100 cubic feet and represented about 1½% of the storage capacity available at the time.
A new cold store at Liverpool, with a capacity of 34,000 cubic feet was destroyed in May before it could be brought into full operation.
The Salvage Branch was not set up until January, 1941, and of the 271,500 tons of food and feeding stuffs affected in 1941, 60% (162,900 tons) was recovered fit for its original use. A further 14% (38,100 tons) was recovered fit for some use other than the original use and only 26% (70,590 tons) was unfit for any use and could not be recovered.
During this period the losses of oil suffered by services and commercial installations were lower than during the previous year.
The losses at naval oil storage installations were about double those at commercial installations and amounted to 53,200 tons of oil and 172,500 tons of tankage lost.
There were no significant losses of tankage at Air Ministry or War Office installations.
At commercial installations there were approximately 25,000 tons of oil and 87,500 tons of tankage lost. This represented ½% of the oil stocks as at 31st December, 1941, and only 1½% of tankage in commission. To offset this loss of tankage some 314,000 tons of Government civil reserve tankage was brought into commission.
During the period 1st January to 31st December, while the effect of enemy action to the gas industry over the country has been considerable, the loss of supplies to the industries for any appreciable period has been negligible.
In London, which suffered from the greatest number of major raids, gas works and distribution systems received a considerable amount of damage, but as the gas manufacturing plant and pumps, etc were not put out of action, there was no serious interference with supplies to industry.
It will be observed on the damage map enclosed that in the first six months of the year London was raided 56 times and that from 22nd June, when Germany commenced their hostilities with Russia, and until the rest of the year there was only one single raid and that raid was not of a major character.
The troubles of the first six months arising from the continual breaking of mains showed the result of a great effort from the speed in which repairs were effected, but it must be remembered that these repairs were rather of a first-aid character. Consequently, if London had been attacked during the winter months towards the end of the year there is no doubt whatsoever that the situation would have been serious.
It is also interesting to note that south-east and south of the Thames the gas supplies would have failed for considerable periods but for the gas grid which was used in that area.
A review of the air raid damage during the period shows that electricity services suffered chiefly in the months of January and May, 6 generating stations being affected in the former month and 8 in the latter.
In the January damage figures, Portsmouth, Plymouth and Bristol were the chief sufferers, interruptions of supply due to power station damage, as well as to distributing mains, being responsible for prolonged interruptions of supply of current, Portsmouth being cut off completely for 2½ days, Plymouth for 24 hours, and Bristol for 16½ hours.
Great Yarmouth was the only town whose generating station was hit during February, but the damage done was so slight that output was not affected.
No major damage was done in the month of March, though 14 generating stations were affected and the grid lines had 21 breakdowns with a loss of 15 hours’ supply. The Portsmouth Corporation supply failed again, this time for 2 nights.
Wallasey Generating Station suffered chiefly from fire damage, and while there were a good many incidents affecting subsidiary transmission lines they were relatively unimportant.
Out of the 10 generating stations, and the Admiralty dockyard station at Portsmouth, affected in April, only in 6 stations were operations interrupted. Grid interruptions of supply totalled 8¾ hours for the month, but other transmission lines were damaged over a wide area, including Coventry, Birmingham, and Plymouth, the last once again sustaining 5 intensive night raids.
May was the most critical month of this period. Eight generating stations were damaged, in the Merseyside, Clyde, Hull and London areas. In Greenock, for instance, on 2 successive nights, the generating and the substations were seriously damaged but by using equipment from the National Reserve of Plant, the interruption of supply was for only 5 days; this, however, might have been for a shorter period had there not been difficulty in clearing a site for the installation of this temporary equipment. It has been decided not to rebuild the Greenock Power Station. Grid lines sustained nearly 24 hours’ supply losses, nearly double the amount of previous months, and other transmission lines, mainly in London, Liverpool and Greenock, suffered heavy damage.
Less damage was caused to electricity supply in June than in any month since September, 1940, slight damage occurring to the generating station at Hastings alone. Grid losses of supply amounted to 11¾ hours, and there were other interruptions in the lesser distributing systems, but these were only minor incidents.
There was no material damage to generating plant during the last half of the year and the total interruption to CEB grid lines by enemy action was only 25½ hours.
At the end of the year only 73,000 kW of generating plant were immobilised as a result of enemy action as compared with 190,000 kW at the end of May.
Eighteen iron and steel works sustained damage, 12 in major towns, 4 in secondary towns and 2 isolated targets. There were 35 attacks on these works, 22 in major towns, 6 in secondary towns and 7 on isolated targets.
The only appreciable loss was at the Ayresome Iron Works, Middlesbrough, and was estimated at 25,000 tons of pig iron through 6 to 8 weeks loss of production.
It can therefore be said, as far as key points were concerned, that the total effect on industry for the year was in no way a hindrance.
The loss of production of iron and steel for the year through air raid damage and warnings was as follows:
The total loss of pig iron 208,924 tons.
The total loss of steel ingots and castings 398,006 tons.
In regard to the total loss of finished steel 12,030 tons was lost from air raid damage, and the loss from air raid warnings was 234,678 tons, making a total of finished steel 246,708 tons.
During 1941, 227 aerodromes were attacked, of which 189 were in the first six months’ period.
From 1st July to 31st December, 38 further aerodromes were attacked, together with 49 which had already been attacked in the first period.
Of the 227 aerodromes attacked in 1941, a total of 144 were east of a line from Selsey Bill to John o’Groats; this figure gives an indication of the concentration of attack. The proportion of key points in this eastern area is approximately one-third of the total for the United Kingdom.
The balance of 83 aerodromes, together with the remaining 2/3rds of the total number of key points, lie to the west of the line from Selsey to John o’Groats.
(in which Key Points were affected)
Place |
January |
February |
March |
April |
May |
|
Aberdeen |
|
|
|
6/7 |
|
|
Avonmouth |
4/5,9/10 |
|
29/30 |
3/4,4/5,9/10, 11/12 |
|
|
Belfast |
|
|
|
7/8 |
|
|
Birmingham |
1/2 |
|
|
|
|
|
Bristol |
|
|
|
3/4,4/5,9/10 |
7/8 |
|
Cardiff |
|
26/27 |
3/4,4/5 |
12/13 |
|
|
Chatham |
|
10/11,15/16, 20/21 |
9/10 |
7/8,19/20 |
27/28 |
|
Clydeside |
- |
- |
- |
- |
- |
|
Coventry |
|
|
|
8/9,9/10 |
|
|
Crewe |
|
|
|
7/8 |
|
|
Gt. Yarmouth |
|
17/18 |
14/15 |
9/10,15/16 |
|
|
Grimsby |
|
23/24 |
|
|
|
|
Hull |
|
14/15 |
4/5,13/14, 15/16, 31/1st Apr |
15/16 |
3/4,5/6,8/9, 11/12,28/29 |
|
London |
5/6,9/10, 12/13,19/20, 29/30 |
13/14,14/15, 15/16,17/18, 19/20,20/21, 26/27 |
4/5,9/10, 15/16,18/19, 20/21 |
10/11,19/20, 20/21 |
|
|
Manchester |
9/10 |
|
11/12 |
14 |
2/3,7/8 |
|
Merseyside |
9/10 |
|
13/14, 14/15 |
15/16 |
1/2,4/5,5/6, 6/7,30/31, 31/1st June |
|
Plymouth |
13/14 |
|