Welcome to the CAS’ Reading List 2012. The theme for last year’s Air Power Conference was the delivery of air and space power in an age of uncertainty. That theme was brought into sharp relief by the events in the Middle East, the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ and, particularly for the RAF, operations over Libya. As we look forward to 2020 and beyond, I see no sign that world events will become any less volatile and, if we are to respond appropriately to the challenges ahead, we all need to remain open-minded, mentally agile and well-informed. Education remains of paramount importance in retaining the conceptual edge and we can all play a part by taking the time to expand our understanding of Air Power by reading more widely.

This reading list is a vehicle by which I hope to stimulate thought in a variety of areas. The list for 2012 is by no means exhaustive but, it does offer a broad range of titles that will educate, inspire and stimulate thought and discussion. I urge everyone to stretch their boundaries and also seek out other books that will challenge your thinking as well as entertain and inform.

Once again, titles encompass a broad range of subjects: ranging from a critical analysis of progress in Afghanistan to a very contemporary view of the events that unfolded during the ‘Arab Spring’ of 2011. There are historical perspectives from Hooten, looking at the development of air power over the Western Front, and a re-examination of the air contribution to Arnhem by Seb Ritchie. The collection of essays in Conceptualising Modern War is likely to have enduring resonance for the air power community. For those looking beyond the military sphere of endeavour, Kahney’s examination of the business, management and leadership lessons that can be gleaned from Steve Jobs’ involvement with Apple, NeXT Computers and the Pixar film studio is a fascinating insight into modern business practices.

I hope that you will take the time to read and learn from the books on this year’s reading list and that it challenges your preconceptions and understanding.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton KCB ADC BSc FRAeS CCMI RAF
Chief of the Air Staff
CAS’ Reading List 2012

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The Chief of the Air Staff by The Director of Defence Studies (RAF).
With the declared date for the drawdown of combat troops in Afghanistan fast approaching, there is an ever-increasing body of literature analysing the current situation in Afghanistan. This body of literature is increasingly polarised into a debate over the future of this beleaguered country. The title of the book under review leaves the reader in no doubt which side of the debate it takes.

The opening sentence of the introduction – ‘It all began so well’ – sets the scene for the remainder of the book. The book is primarily about intervention and its main argument is that the strategy conceptualised and conducted in Afghanistan was flawed. It is highly critical of the ‘conflated’ and ‘nebulous’ series of goals that were all used interchangeably. Also, the book argues that different national preferences regarding poppy eradication, security sector reform, Taliban reconciliation, the policy towards Pakistan and infrastructure development prevented a unified approach. Bird and Marshall ultimately describe Afghanistan as a ‘laboratory’ in which Western states sought to develop a comprehensive and interagency approach to stabilisation.

The book begins with a chapter on the historical context of Afghanistan. Tracing geo-political, economic and military events from Ahmed Shah through the ‘Iron Amir’ to the Taliban, Bird and Marshall provide an illuminating summation of the challenging environment facing any intervention in Afghanistan. The subsequent two chapters take the reader through the US decision-making process in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to initial combat operations and the hunt for Osama Bin Laden. Chapter three is arguably the most interesting for the airpower enthusiast, describing how airpower proved crucial to the rout of the Taliban as it moved from targeting fixed locations to the Taliban fielded forces. Air mobility was also vital in rapidly deploying Special Forces to key locations. Airpower was the force multiplier that enabled such a ‘light footprint’ to be so effective.

The distraction caused by the Iraq War in 2003 is central to the book’s argument about ‘how the west lost its way’. In chapter four it is argued that one of the primary reasons for a Taliban revival was the political, military and media focus on Iraq. A host of other factors for the Taliban revival are also provided, including divisions within NATO, a mismanaged security sector reform, divergent approaches to counter-narcotics, increasing corruption, a lethargic delivery of promised international financial aid and the flawed constitution and corrupt voting system.

Having provided the backdrop for a Taliban revival, the following three chapters deal extensively with strategy and policy errors during the expansion of the ISAF mission from 2006-2011. The deployment of ISAF forces across Afghanistan and in particular into the south, the influence of Pakistan as both a threat and an opportunity and the
search for an exit are all analysed against a backdrop of a continued deterioration in security. In particular, the counterinsurgency strategy employed in Afghanistan, and widely lauded after its apparent success in Iraq, is extensively criticised in chapter 7 as it is argued that three of the factors for successful counterinsurgency – border security, reliable and capable government and self-sustaining, honest security forces – were non-existent.

The overriding conclusions are threefold: firstly, that the strategy has been misguided and inconsistent; secondly, state-building is a misnomer in a country where the vestiges and identity of a ‘state’ are non-existent; and, thirdly, counterinsurgency cannot be used to remedy the flawed strategic approach of the coalition intervention in Afghanistan.

This book is essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the challenges and problems which ultimately led to the current situation in Afghanistan. It is eminently readable, the chapters are concise and well-structured and the chronological approach is interlaced with relevant thematic issues making the argument extremely easy to follow.

Due to the evolving situation in Afghanistan events up to and after 2014 will ultimately determine the book’s veracity. The criticisms by Bird and Marshall do have merit and adeptly explain the challenges in Afghanistan over the past ten years; however, if the optimists are correct and a successful transition or a political solution is in the offing the final verdict of history will differ significantly to the argument put forth in this book.
By the time that the 2010 General Election campaign began, there were few areas of clarity as to what might occur following the closing of the polls. The different policies of the main parties suggested that there were some significant variations in possible approaches to tackling such big issues as the national financial crisis, the demands of the National Health Service and tackling the burgeoning welfare budget. Further confusion was sown by the growing appreciation on the part of a number of commentators and pollsters that the assumed clear victory for the Conservative Party could not be taken for granted because of the nuances of the British political system. Yet, in amongst this uncertainty, there was one policy area which all three main parties were agreed upon: that, over a decade after the Strategic Defence Review, the time for a new review of Britain’s approach to defence was now overdue, not least since a decade-long commitment to Afghanistan and British involvement in Iraq had imposed massive burdens upon the armed forces; worse yet, there was a massive, unsustainable ‘black hole’ at the heart of defence spending, which meant that the nation was attempting to procure and maintain military capabilities that, taken together, it simply could not afford unless there was to be a politically unacceptable and dramatic rebalancing of government spending towards the defence budget. Furthermore, the challenges presented by global terrorism and changing perspectives towards security - in no small part driven by the development of a national security strategy which went beyond the realm of exclusively military issues – meant that this much-anticipated review was to be of a broad scope.

When the SDSR was finally published, it was to very mixed reviews. The elimination of the Nimrod MRA4 programme, the retirement of the joint RAF/RN Harrier force and the associated retirement of HMS Ark Royal attracted most attention from the media. The latter decision also led to some of the most spectacularly ill-informed and relentlessly inaccurate commentary on air power matters seen since the days of naysayers of the early part of the 20th Century who proclaimed that military aviation would never amount to much, often by those who, it might have been hoped, would have taken a broader view, rather than retreating to parochial assertion.

This climate makes a book such as A Question of Security welcome. Produced shortly after the SDSR was completed, it contains eighteen chapters linked under thematic headings: Grand Strategy; Partners and Problems; Ways and Means and Delivery. The latter section is largest with seven chapters examining everything from the delivery of air power to defence industrial strategy, set up by the earlier contextual chapters which demonstrate the fearsome difficulties and challenges facing British defence in the early part of the 21st Century.

The chapter perhaps of most interest to those perusing the Chief of the Air Staff’s Air Power Reading List is likely to be that by Professor Eric Grove making the case for the continued existence of the Royal Air Force. It was a strange feature
of the SDSR process that siren calls demanding that the review return Britain to the position that it was in 1914, with separate Army and Naval air services emanated from a number of quarters. On closer examination, the best that could have been said about most of these proposals was that they would in due course, at least have returned the United Kingdom’s air power to almost exactly the position it was in 1917, whereupon the blueprint to create the Royal Air Force could have been dusted off and implemented with only minor tinkering. Professor Grove’s chapter rises above this, and makes a clear rationale for why the retention of an independent air service is necessary. The fact that this call comes from one of the nation’s leading authorities on maritime matters makes it all the more significant, although Grove is critical of the approach adopted by the RAF in a number of areas, particularly its attitude to maritime aviation and aircraft carriers. This lively chapter is likely to provoke much debate, and despite a tendency to believe some of the less-than-sophisticated critiques of the Tornado GR4 that appeared to be drip fed to the press during the SDSR process, Professor Grove’s contribution should be welcomed.

Elsewhere, Professor Hew Strachan examines the relationship between the services and the British people, paying particular attention to the military covenant, offering a number of interesting observations on this issue, drawing comparisons with the manner in which other nations handle the treatment of veterans after public focus upon conflict has faded.

The chapters on procurement provide sobering reading, as do those suggesting that there is some room for improvement in the areas of defence information and defence intelligence, but that the SDSR might not enable this to full effect. Equally as telling is the demonstration of the strategic dilemmas facing the United Kingdom, particularly Michael Codner’s dissection of the possible approaches that might be adopted and the difficulties associated with each.

While there is much of value in the book, some caveats must be noted. It is perhaps unfortunate that Eric Grove’s chapter on the Royal Air Force was not accompanied with similar chapters on possible future directions for the Royal Navy and the Army, not least a full dissection of the implications for the latter organisation of the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the likely lack of toleration on the part of the electorate for future interventions of this kind. Such a chapter would complement Geoff Till’s thoughtful examination of post-Afghanistan strategy admirably. Likewise, while chapters on the SDSR and the implications for Anglo-American, Anglo-French and Sino-British relations are present, the lack of a chapter dealing with India is slightly disappointing. Given the variety of information contained in the book, the lack of an index to permit cross-referencing is regrettable.

Finally, and most obviously, A Question of Security runs the risk of being seen as a snapshot of the debate in the immediate aftermath of the SDSR process. This would be unfair, for although some of the contentions raised in the book have been disproved by events over Libya during Operation Ellamy, other comments have proven to be prescient, particularly some of those made by Michael Codner in his consideration of armed inducement and associated concepts. Although produced as a fairly immediate response to the SDSR, A Question of Security covers the ground effectively and establishes a firm foundation for consideration of what was contained in the review and – just as significantly - what was left out and areas which remain ripe for development.
THE ARAB SPRING: REBELLION, REVOLUTION AND A NEW WORLD ORDER

By Toby Manhire

Publisher: Guardian Books, 2012
ISBN  978-0852652541, 320 pages

Reviewed by Group Captain (Ret’d) Ian Shields

In the immediate aftermath of the Falklands War there was a plethora of books rushed out by journalists who had sailed south with the Task Force. They were highly personal accounts based on the experiences of the journalists – one thinks of The Winter War by Patrick Bishop of the Observer and John Witheroe of The Times (a very early example) for example: good journalism that captured the feeling of those involved and stand as testament to the deeds undertaken. They were followed by a second wave, not many months later in some instances, that were more a factual account and less biographical – again, a good example was The Falklands War: The Full Story by the Sunday Times Insight team. These, and many others, were powerful examples of journalism, told very individual stories (mainly) very well, and provide a useful – albeit imperfect – insight into a war. Fast forward to 2011 and we have another conflict: different in nature, in a different geographical sphere, but again extensively covered by journalists: The Arab Spring. Now we have one of the first examples of books written by journalists who covered the conflict, and in this instance one edited by Toby Manhire of the Guardian. In some ways this book is entirely different from those of that war 30 years ago: journalism has changed significantly with access to satellite communications that give journalists near-guaranteed real-time and truly independent communication, while the style of reporting, particularly the use of the blog and of on-line articles affords an immediacy and effectively limitless word counts that would have been the envy of those covering the South Atlantic in 1982.

This lengthy book on The Arab Spring is in two parts. The first, covering some 200 pages, comprises a series of (albeit edited) blog postings from Guardian and Observer journalists covering the uprisings in 2011, and posted live. They make a fascinating read: they catch the uncertainty, the fears and the hopes of those involved that recaptures the spirit of those uncertain months with clarity, leading to a feeling of immediacy. The second half of this book is a series of 33 essays, each of 2 – 5 pages, written by columnists from the two papers. The essays are arranged in subject clumps: first by country (Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, etc) and then by theme. Both types are very interesting, with some telling analysis particularly in the latter group (covering issues such as the role of Al-Jazeera or the role of social media).

Well written, as one would expect of such high quality journalists, the book does have its limitations. Like those that flooded out in 1982, while strong on immediacy they are necessarily restricted on reflection and balance. And this book has a second problem that was not an issue 30 years ago: the uprisings are not yet over, so unlike the Falklands War there is not yet closure. This book does not try to be definitive (one of its many strengths) nor try fully to explain or dissect cause and effect. It should, however, have a place on the bookshelves of anyone who studies current affairs and security as it captures the flavour of this complicated, unfinished and highly significant rising, and is recommended.
CONCEPTUALISING MODERN WARFARE

By Karl Erik Haug & Ole Jørgen Maaø

Publisher: Hurst & Company, 2011
ISBN 978-1849041430, 320 pages

Reviewed by Professor Matthew Uttley

The collection of essays in Conceptualising Modern War analyses how and why the military establishment and academia define new terms and develop concepts in the enduring struggle to understand and adapt to the changing character of conflict. In doing so, the book provides a critical assessment of key concepts that have dominated post-Cold War western thinking, notably ‘asymmetrical warfare’ and ‘Fourth Generation War’, and the application of these ideas in the form of ‘Network-Centric Warfare’ and ‘Effects-Based Operations’. The credibility of the volume stems from its mix of contributions from eminent academics together with younger analysts offering new perspectives. The primary value of Conceptualising Modern War for the air power practitioner is its insights into the practical tasks of understanding, reasoning and problem-solving in a contemporary operating environment characterised by ‘uncertainty, complexity, ambiguity and volatility’.

The book is divided into three main sections. After Hew Strachan’s survey of the changing character of war, chapters in the first section examine the main terms seeking to define contemporary warfare, namely, asymmetric conflict (Jan Angstrom), ‘Fourth Generation War’ (Antulio Echevarria), and Mary Kaldour’s ‘New Wars’ concept (Ole Jørgen Maaø). The second section analyses those concepts seeking to explain and create opportunities for victory in warfare, with chapters addressing guerrilla war and insurgency (Ian Beckett, Steven Metz and Helen Dexter), counterinsurgency (Jens Ringsmore), ‘Effects-Based Operations’ (Torgier Sæveraas), ‘Network Centric Warfare’ (Arent Arntzen and Tor Olav Groten). Notable here is the chapter devoted to airpower and ‘the need for more analytical warriors’ (Dag Henriksen). The third section evaluates wider developments in thinking about contemporary warfare and includes treatments of ‘Macro-Level’ approaches to contemporary war (Torbjørn Knutsen), contemporary and modern war (Nils Naastad), and ‘Actor-Based Theory’ of modern war (David Kilcullen). Taken collectively, these contributions succeed in illuminating the span of concepts that have dominated the discourse on warfare in the post-Cold War era.

Conceptualising Modern War deserves the status of ‘essential reading’ for the air power practitioner for three reasons. First, it is rigorous in deconstructing core concepts that inform contemporary military thinking, doctrines and the practical conduct of operations. As Beatrice Heuser points out, ‘with trenchant critiques of key concepts like “asymmetry” and “generations of war”, this carefully researched collection weeds out much of the nonsense and half-digested ideas found elsewhere’. The book therefore succeeds in its stated objective of demonstrating that ‘very few of the terms and concepts are particularly useful when it comes to defining war or for creating a strategy to win them’ (p. xii). Second, the various contributions act as a clarion call for the academic and practitioner communities to retain healthy scepticism when confronted with new concepts that purport to capture the dynamics of modern warfare and offer recipes for operational success. Third, the value of the collection of essays is the emphasis they place on the
inherent necessity for the military profession and academia to engage in ‘critical thinking’ whenever ‘new terms and concepts appear on the horizon’ (p. xii) – something that is critical if western militaries are remain agile and adaptable in responding to the polymorphous character of conflict.

In conclusion, Conceptualising Modern War is core reading for air power practitioners, the military profession as a whole and the academic community. As Andrew Dorman correctly observes, ‘the volume fits neatly into the current literature filling an important niche and providing a book that will not be rapidly overcome by events, it could become a timeless classic’.
Given the monumental transformation of aviation during World War I, the lack of modern air power literature concentrating on that intense four year period is surprising. At the beginning of the conflict, military aviation was experimental in nature and few would have predicted the massive leap forward which occurred during the War. Aircraft were transformed from machines held together with string and hope, to efficient, well-designed, reliable craft offering a range of capabilities far beyond anything the Wright brothers could have imagined only fifteen years earlier. The author of War over the Trenches laments this dearth of literature and attempts to redress the balance in a single tome.

E.R. Hooten has chosen to examine the development of airpower, not through the prism of a single air force study, but by scrutinising all of the forces involved in the struggle for control of the air on the Western Front. In order to do this, the author has researched archives in France, Belgium, the UK and the USA. Given that he examines the whole period of the war from the perspective of all protagonists, this is an ambitious book. Broadly researched and making use of archive material which had not previously been used, the book provides the reader with a fascinating and detailed account of the way air power developed during the course of the war. Necessarily, the book takes many unexpected turns, often in a single page, to allow Hooten to navigate the vast subject matter he sets out to cover. While this style does give the reader the impression of being on a frenetic journey, I sense that this is done deliberately to reflect the exploratory nature of the youthful world of military aviation at the time. Hooten approaches his subject chronologically, allowing him to provide the reader with a broad understanding of how varying approaches to aviation developed within the wider context of the War. Thus he introduces the newcomer to World War I aviation matters against the backdrop of the better known battles of the land campaigns of the conflict helping to contextualise the air war.

Although employing a chronological approach, Hooten does, nevertheless, succeed in maintaining parallel themes throughout the book. He examines the roles aircraft were employed in as their utility beyond that of reconnaissance was rapidly recognised and goes on to track the development of aircraft as the bomber and fighter roles mature. He also examines a range of more esoteric aviation tasks such as dropping spies with cages of carrier pigeons behind enemy lines. The ingenuity of such examples of the use of air power that Hooten uncovers serve as a reminder of how cutting edge and flexible aviation was, particularly in an era when the carrier pigeon was still considered a reliable and essential means of communication.

Whilst Hooten does scrutinise air power from the tactical and operational perspective, he shies away from examining the nascent strategic development of air power, stating that it is outside ‘the scope of this book’. This is particularly disappointing given that the developments of aviation in World War I subsequently fuelled the air power theorists’
debates concerning the strategic application of aircraft for much of the interwar period. Another cause for
disappointment is that the book is light on subject matter analysis. However, this is made up for by the fascinating facts
Hooten uncovers throughout the book. As an established author and journalist, his lively and engaging style also helps
to make the vast subject area he has chosen accessible and a good read.

In his preface, Hooten laments the lack of study of air power in World War I, particularly anything which meaningfully
transcends national boundaries. It is perhaps because of this that he has single-handedly attempted to fill that void,
providing us with a balanced international view of aviation on the Western front. Whilst he elects not to examine
the strategic aspects of WWI and leaves us to draw our own conclusions about aerial warfare over the trenches of the
Western Front, Hooten has succeeded in delivering a broad, yet deep, understanding of the subject, in a single volume,
which is of particular use to a student of air power new to this most important period of aviation history.
LOSING SMALL WARS: BRITISH MILITARY FAILURE IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

By Frank Ledwidge

Publisher: Yale University Press, 2011
ISBN 978-0300166712, 304 pages

Reviewed by Squadron Leader Stuart Peoples

For most of us, especially those that have served in Iraq or Afghanistan, the reading of this book may be uncomfortable, at times irritating, and even upsetting. Ledwidge’s thesis is that the British military, especially the Army, has developed a degree of self-deluding over-confidence in its ability to succeed in counter-insurgency operations and that, at a strategic level, it is institutionally incapable of learning from recent experiences. The author is a retired RNR intelligence officer and a barrister with military service in the Balkans and Iraq, but who has also spent time working on reconstructing judicial systems in Afghanistan. This book is inspired by his experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan but is far from being based solely on them. It is meticulously researched, with over 500 references, and written in a personable style which just seethes with indignation and even acrimony.

In the first part of the book are detailed and withering expositions of the British Army’s activity in Iraq, culminating in the withdrawal from Basra and of the operations in Afghanistan, specifically Helmand, from 2001. Ledwidge seeks to show that the military strategy in each of these cases was and is inappropriate and is, at a strategic level, seemingly incapable of successfully evolving in the light of experience. He makes a case for these failings being primarily intellectual; not that generals are stupid but that they have constrained themselves to a “can do” frame of reference which only lets them act in ways in which they have been trained or previously operated. In the second part, Ledwidge analyses why this failure of leadership occurred and lays the blame squarely and, according to him, fairly on poor generalship: “The British were at sea in both places, devoid of viable doctrine, without awareness of their environment, lacking adequate forces and minus any coherent strategy to pursue. All this was coupled with a hubris which attracted its inevitable riposte - nemesis”. At all times Ledwidge is very careful to confine his criticisms to one star rank and above: “Given the direct and immediate consequences of the choices facing these men [those in contact with insurgents] it is far harder to level distant criticism at them than at the generals who command them”. The book concludes with suggestions to overcome the problems he has outlined.

Losing Small Wars paints a vivid picture, but not the whole picture. Although mentioning the political aspects of becoming involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, these are not explored to the point of reaching any conclusions such as, is the military being given an impossible task? The book tries to highlight that there is no desire on the military’s part to analyse objectively the reasons for its success, or otherwise, in Basra and Helmand at a strategic level. This book prompted a re-reading of Norman Dixon’s On the Psychology of Military Incompetence and some parallels are striking. Ledwidge holds the Americans up to be paragons of flexibility and of learning from mistakes and changing circumstances. He carries this on occasion a little too far in trying to support his argument, giving the impression that the entire American military has a Petreaus-like educational zeal. However, he rightly makes the point that the US
investment in higher military education is proportionally much larger than the UK’s and that the US military culture is far more open to contentious discussion.

Of what relevance is this critique of British Army senior officers to the Royal Air Force? Well, although not commented on in this book, it is a reminder that the RAF were demonstrably not well-led in Singapore in 1941/2; and was the RAF tardy in switching from low-level to medium bombing in the First Gulf War, and could its most senior leadership have done more in the early stages of the programmes to avert the Nimrod AEW and Nimrod MR4A debacles? Overall, Losing Small Wars makes a very strong case for education of a type not available entirely within UK Defence and the need for the continuing development of our most senior leaders.

I commend this book to you. You may throw it across the room a few times, but it is worth retrieving, finishing and then discussing with colleagues.
Can intervention work? is the second work in Amnesty International’s Global Ethics series of publications, and features a pair of essays, one by each of the book’s 2 co-authors, Rory Stewart and Gerald Knaus. Drawing mainly on the experiences of Bosnia and Afghanistan, but also citing conflicts in Vietnam, Kosovo, and Iraq, the 2 authors seek to understand, as practitioners, when, and under what conditions, interventions work and when they fail. Portraying Bosnia as a success story, but attributing that success to different factors to those generally held up by the international community; and Afghanistan as an intervention failure, a failure to acknowledge failure, and a demonstration of the danger of believing that failure is not an option, the authors use these 2 experiences to evaluate different models for intervention. Together they disavow the simplistic school of thought which treats intervention as a business grounded by scientific mores, as well as a modern and liberal interpretation of 21st Century imperialism, to conclude that while intervention can work, the key to its success is through an approach which Knaus coins as ‘principled incrementalism,’ with contextual understanding at its heart.

Through their respective case studies, Stewart and Knaus both dismiss what they call the ‘Planning School’ proponents’ scientifically formulaic theory for successful intervention, epitomised in RAND Corporation’s Beginner’s guide to nation-building, which suggests that successful interventions depend solely on empirical computations matching ends and means. Stewart laments the fallacious reduction of the complex and culturally dependent art of statecraft to an abstract consultancy task of nation building conducted according to a universally applicable business model. He posits that this approach resulted in a flawed strategy in Afghanistan whereby increasing human and financial resources were committed to the intervention at the expense of crucial investment in attaining a comprehensive comprehension of the nation’s culture. Knaus meanwhile challenges the notion that greater investment through increased troop numbers relates directly to fewer casualties. Together they assert that reform in Western ‘Planning School’ thinking is essential if interventionism is not to become increasingly ill-informed, dangerous, and eventually discredited.

Knaus describes liberal imperialism as a model in which the dominant factor becomes strong leadership to swiftly overcome those who would wish to oppose or derail an intervention. Taking the Planning School of thought to its logical conclusion, challenging the idea that a ‘light footprint’ approach can ever succeed, liberal imperialism instead asserts that one must go in hard and heavy-handed to realise fundamental structural reform and enforce governance from the outset, even if not militarily, to achieve success. This theory even goes so far as to suggest that temporary acceptance of non-democratic ideals, if necessary to assure the desired change, may be a necessary evil in pursuit of the long-term good. Applying it to Bosnia and Iraq, Knaus rejects this theory. Comparing the 2 interventions, he
demonstrates why he considers the liberal imperialist intervention in Iraq to be a failure, while discrediting the view that Bosnia exemplifies liberal imperialist success on the grounds that the intervention was not conducted in accordance with this model.

Showcasing Bosnia as the exemplar of intervention success, Knaus pre-emptively dismisses the contention that a foreign power’s inescapable inability to adequately understand cultural context dooms all interventions to inevitable failure. Indeed, concurring with Stewart that contextual understanding is the decisive factor in a successful intervention, he observes that successful intervention is an art form subject to a sliding scale (a ‘continuum of intervention’), not a formulaic science with a binary outcome, success or failure. It results from an iterative process of understanding development in which each step must be a product of informed bargaining, during which the likely risks and benefits are first balanced and then subsequently constantly reviewed. Intrinsically chaotic and unpredictable, it is a business of trial and error, beset with false starts and blind alleyways, giving the lie to any conception that failure can not be an option, and demanding that the wisdom of continuance be constantly questioned. Since the context of every conflict will inherently be different to those which have preceded it, so, according to Stewart and Knaus’ theory of principled incrementalism, there can be no single model for success in which ‘one size fits all.’ Context is an art, not a science, and contextual awareness can not be gained through theoretical study or extrapolation, only through practical and evolving ‘hands dirty’ experience.

Can intervention work? provides a timely call for self-reflection as the UK and USA advance their force reductions in Afghanistan. The US-led ‘surges’ in Afghanistan are well known, and Stewart documents the progressive force augmentations of the last 10 years meticulously, yet Afghanistan as a nation remains culturally very distant from Western ideology. Viewing engagement, whether friendly or hostile, through the eyes of the target society, is notoriously difficult, and never more so than when that society is culturally very far removed from one’s own. Cultural understanding and engagement can not be enhanced overnight. It is a generational capability which can only be augmented by strategic investment with a gestation measured in years, yet the trust it generates can be lost in an instant through misplaced effects in a kinetic theatre of operations. The scalability of air power, the military and political flexibility to augment or diminish its application, and the precise effects which can be generated through using the latest precision targeting, low collateral, weapons, afford air power unrivalled utility in contextually complex interventions. In contrast to the arithmetic model of the Planning School, the appropriate application of tailored air power will become an ever increasingly powerful and crucial tool in assuring security as ground troop numbers are reduced in Afghanistan.

Although both Stewart and Knaus make passing reference to operations over Libya, they were writing at a time too early to draw any meaningful observations from that campaign. Nevertheless, they are correct to both be at pains to point out that the West should not shy away from intervention when necessary for fear of being inextricably drawn into what Knaus describes as a ‘pseudo-universalist’ web of intervention demands or opportunities. Just as intervening in Bosnia didn’t commit the West to global intervention thereafter, nor does the more recent Operation Unified Protector over Libya now commit NATO to an open-ended role of unlimited world policing. Moreover, Knaus’ astute observation of US President Clinton’s tightly bounded undertaking to commit military force not to a conflict in the Balkans but only to assure the realisation of an existing peace accord, increasingly reflects 21st Century politicians’ reticence, especially in
the aftermath of Iraq and Afghanistan, to undertake any form of imperialistic intervention, however liberal, in favour of graduated intervention.

Knaus suggests that the tight definition of an intervention mandate is more important than any empirical computation of the required intervention force. The NATO air campaigns over Kosovo and more recently over Libya support this view, with UNSCR 1973 specifically prohibiting “a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory,” which would necessarily have led adherents of the Planning School to abandon all intervention objectives. The success of Operations Allied Force and Unified Protector demonstrate clearly how tightly bounded intervention for humanitarian purposes can be successful while recognising that military objectives may need to be adapted during an intervention as unfolding events shape the desired political end state. In Libya, as in the Balkans, NATO did not join the civil uprising, but instead through assuring the security of civilians enabled them to create the opportunity to determine their own future. This is principled incrementalism, and as Knaus observes, although far from being the ‘intellectually gratifying and emotionally appealing’ chimera envisaged by a former Australian foreign minister of bringing an end to mass atrocity crimes for once and for all, it does nevertheless appear to represent a realistic explanatory model for successful intervention.

Finally, the requirement for contextual comprehension is not limited to the military domain, and both authors reflect on its importance for the other arms of national power during the post-conflict phase of an intervention. Stewart argues that state building through contextualised cultural development has been replaced by ill-advised over-investment managed by consultants intellectually far removed from the coalface realities of a nation under reconstruction, while Knaus goes so far as to suggest that beyond being simply ineffective, this emerging trend can even become counter-productive. As coalition military forces draw down in war-torn Afghanistan, and in Libya as it emerges from 40 years of oppression and despotic rule, in the well-intentioned scramble to rebuild these nations as secure members of the international community, the diplomatic and economic arms of government must now guard against the hazards of such premature over-investment in rebuilding until they too have a clear and comprehensive understanding of the cultural context of these complex nations’ heritage.

Just as Knaus observes that however successful it was, the Bosnian experience can not be viewed as a model for all future interventions, so NATO must be cautious not to interpret Libya as a de facto blueprint for future intervention. In Can intervention work? Stewart and Knaus successfully demonstrate some of the preconditions for successful intervention, and offer principled incrementalism underpinned by deep contextual understanding as a coherent model for its successful execution. However, the air power disciple must be cautious not to conflate these 2 propositions. Just as surely as the adage that the only certainty is that the next conflict will not be the same as the last, so adherence to Stewart and Knaus’ conditions for intervention does not inherently assure a successful outcome. The key to success in intervention lies neither in cultural predilection nor scientific prediction, but through a deep understanding of the art form which is context.
ETHICS, LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS

By David Whetham

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Reviewed by Air Commodore (Ret’d) Dr Peter Gray

An ethical approach to warfare may seem like an oxymoron, especially when a nation, or collection of nations, are in a situation of supreme emergency. And yet even in this eventuality, there has always been debate as to the rights and wrongs of going to war and how to behave once the fighting has started. Those involved in the political, strategic and military planning processes need to be conversant with the vocabulary and the main arguments likely to be deployed. Equally all practitioners – especially of air power – have a real need to understand the complexities of legal and ethical debate. It is entirely appropriate therefore for volumes such as this to be on the CAS Reading List.

The editor is a senior lecturer at the Joint Services Command and Staff College and is certainly well qualified to produce this book. Dr Whetham’s own chapters provide useful introductions to the topic as a whole and its importance and to the concept of Just War Theory. This provides a useful language, or vocabulary, through which to discuss the issues raised by a specific conflict; the casual reader, however, needs to be aware that much of the terminology is shared with the international law of armed conflict. This is also covered by a dedicated chapter on law and the operational level of warfare which does include a section on targeting with examples from Allied Force. Nevertheless, this particular volume is a little land centric, but the essence is valuable to all servicemen and women.

In a lecture to the Royal United Services Institute in February 1898, W. V. Herbert queried whether it was possible to have an ethical side to warfare. He went on to discount the arguments germane to the professional philosopher who ‘will argue a soul into a stone, and beauty into the earthworm’, preferring to align the discussion with ‘the ordinary fight-your-daily-battle individual like you and me’. Although Herbert acknowledged that there was a need to develop, a ‘firmly-established and universally-accepted code’ to regulate the conduct of warfare, he went on to stress that ‘All said and done, ‘Win your war’ is the most important, and it is the most primitive, maxim of the science of strategy – that is drive your opponent into such a corner that he is content to have the terms of peace dictated to him. The rest comes a long way after. From a lay point of view this has a degree of sense to it. In international relations terminology, the theoretical term is Realism. David J. Lonsdale’s chapter gives a much needed view from this perspective. He laments that there are all too frequently premature calls for a ceasefire and that there is more concern for the costs of conflict than for victory. Lonsdale stresses the importance of ‘strategic necessity’ through which violence has to be controlled in relation to the key needs.

Where Lonsdale queries the desirability of having ‘lawyers and moralists’ peering over every operational detail, there is a reality check in that modern warfare has the press of many nations and of diverse agendas crawling all over the detail
and the aftermath. It is therefore essential that strategists take this into account and maintain the highest possible standards in Rules of Engagement and targeting. Given the inevitability of this discussion – and the continuing debate over the strategic bomber offensive against Germany – it is important that all involved with the prosecution of air power understand the vocabulary and language of ethics, legitimacy and legality.
The Strategic Defence Review of 1998 was unashamedly interventionist in outlook and aspirational in philosophy. It was, therefore, not entirely surprising that it mandated the acquisition of a fleet aircraft-carrier capability for expeditionary power projection, resulting in the two-ship Queen Elizabeth programme that is currently underway. However, the strategic environment has changed fundamentally since the project was instigated: the global recession ushered in an era of austerity in UK defence spending, with inevitable scrutiny of the most expensive planned capabilities, while a decade of enduring, land (and air-land) centric operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have called into question the degree of priority that should be given to the procurement of new carriers in an already overheated equipment programme. The result has been an acrimonious and very public debate about both the carriers and the Joint Strike Fighter planned as their primary combat capability, conducted within a context of fierce inter-service competition for limited resources. Although the issue was settled by the prime ministerial decision—taken immediately prior to the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review—to build both carriers (although only one is likely to enter service), this was offset by the imposition of a ‘capability holiday’ in carrier-based naval aviation through the early disposal of HMS Ark Royal and Joint Force Harrier. The SDSR debate, and the way it was conducted, has arguably created a legacy of inter-service distrust that is only likely to be dispelled by the demonstration of good faith and the development of mutual empathy over a protracted period of time; but from an RAF perspective, this is essential, as JSF will represent the core of the air component’s future top-end combat air capability beyond 2020, so close and harmonious engagement with the Navy is a necessity, not a luxury.

Against this backdrop, the publication of this collection of essays charting the theory and practice of British naval aviation is timely, as it provides a useful context for developing a better understanding of the roles, requirements, opportunities and sensitivities involved with the delivery of air power in the maritime and littoral environments; and while many of the papers are ostensibly historical, the themes they highlight are of absolute contemporary relevance. The editor, Tim Benbow, may be known to some RAF personnel through his role in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College, London at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Shrivenham. As a maritime historian, he has followed a broadly chronological approach in assembling this volume, but key issues emerge repeatedly across the chapters: particularly the long-standing controversy about the control of naval air power (and the ownership of ship-based air assets) and the interplay between strategy, capability and service politics at the most crucial turning points in British defence policy.

In this respect, Edward Hampshire’s paper about the cancellation of CVA01 in 1965 provides a useful counterpoint to Lee Willetts’ concluding essay on the politics around the current Queen Elizabeth class carriers, with both pieces providing an insight into the Navy’s thinking and sensitivities. The ‘traumatic shock’ of the CVA01 decision is so firmly embedded
in the RN’s institutional psyche that (at least subliminally) it still affects its relationship with the RAF today, and certainly shaped its approach to the recent SDSR. As Hampshire points out, there has never been any hard evidence that the air staff nefariously moved the position of an island airbase on a map of the Indian Ocean to support its argument for land-basing aircraft over carrier acquisition, but the fact that this myth still has such widespread currency within the Navy is instructive in itself. The Navy’s visceral sense of betrayal was further heightened by the Falklands War, where the RAF was unable to provide land-based air cover for the fleet (as the RN believed it had promised to do when CVA01 was cancelled) and the RN felt it would have suffered far fewer losses if it had been able to deploy a large, fleet carrier with a much bigger and more capable air wing than was possible with the small VSTOL carriers that were available. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the RAF made an effective case in 1965 by ‘restraining its firebrands’ and adopting a moderate, logical argument that was regularly updated by the Chief of the Air Staff’s office and articulated by all of its senior leadership, enabling a single, consistent message to be delivered that could be easily understood by politicians and decision-makers; arguably, the same clarity of thought and messaging has not always been evident in subsequent defence reviews.

The recent focus on air-land integration in Afghanistan and the dissolution of the maritime patrol aircraft force means that air-maritime integration has become something of a neglected competency in the UK; for example, it is barely mentioned in the current iteration of AP3000: British Air and Space Doctrine, although this omission will be addressed in the forthcoming edition. The examples of the practice of maritime air power and air-sea cooperation in this collection are therefore welcome, including new insights on the role of naval aviation in limited wars and crisis management, and areas that have previously received scant attention, such as the contribution of British naval air power in the Mediterranean and Pacific theatres in the Second World War. Geoffrey Till’s analysis of the Singapore campaign is particularly useful in highlighting the problem of competing visions of air power and the consequent requirement for effective integration through the employment of mutually supportive – rather than independent – air and maritime capabilities.

Taken as a whole, this volume offers a comprehensive survey of a key aspect of air power as well as shedding new light on the way that Britain’s defence policy, strategy and military capabilities relate to one another. Airmen may find some of the views offered by enthusiastically maritime-orientated academics challenging, while more careful copy-editing would have removed minor irritations such as the misspelling of ‘air marshal’. Nevertheless, there is still much here that bears careful consideration. The Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre’s Future Character of Conflict work predicts that future wars are most likely to be fought in the littoral, while Libya has pointed the way to an air-maritime strategy as an alternative to the ‘boots on the ground’ commitment of land forces for future interventions. Air-maritime integration will, therefore, be an inescapable part of the RAF’s future, especially as so much of the air component’s combat capability will be capable of being ship-based. In a sense, the relationship should be instinctive, as doctrinally air and maritime power are very closely linked; for example, the principles of sea control and control of the air have much in common. However, as this book amply demonstrates, effective integration has proved to be elusive in the past, often for reasons of personality and because of issues of ownership rather than the actual practice of aviation from (and over) the sea. Airmen and sailors need to work together as a matter of urgency to develop their thinking about the employment of air power in the maritime environment; this volume provides the necessary background to start the process, and is recommended whole-heartedly for the purpose.
Firstly it should be noted that this book isn’t really a biography of Steve Jobs, if you are looking for one of those I would suggest you reach for Walter Isaacson’s eponymously titled book. Rather this book is an examination of the business, management and leadership lessons that can be gleaned from Steve Jobs’ involvement with Apple, NeXT Computers and the Pixar film studio. This book also isn’t a retrospective rushed out following the death of Jobs in Oct 2012. It was first published in 2008 and has not been updated to take into account some of the significant developments at Apple since then (notably the iPad). The author, Leander Kahney, is a well-respected Apple watcher; he has been a reporter and editor of ‘Wired’ magazine and is currently the publisher of the ‘Cult of Mac’ website. This book is his attempt at describing what made Steve Jobs such a successful CEO. Kahney’s writing style translates well in this book and each chapter can be read as a standalone article and concludes with a series of ‘Lessons from Steve’ bullet points which highlight the key takeaways from that section.

Kahney is largely sympathetic to his subject, painting a picture of a driven individual, truly committed to his companies and the products that they develop and produce. From reading this book it is impossible to imagine Steve Jobs ever uttering the words ‘I don’t do detail’. It is clear that he would be deeply involved in every element of a product lifecycle: the materials used, the layout of circuit boards, software design and usability, the boxes in which products are packaged, store layout, the style and size of font used, and the way in which products are launched and advertised, are all offered by Kahney as examples of Jobs’ meticulous pursuit of perfectionism.

The subject of product development is well handled. Kahney notes that Jobs wasn’t that good an innovator. However, he was a master at perfecting the concepts of others and making them marketable, and at a premium. There were PCs, MP3 players and smartphones about before Apple entered these markets, what Jobs did was ensure that Apple produced the best in class items and a whole support structure around them. This follows through with the iPad. Bill Gates, Microsoft and leading PC manufacturers had been pushing the Tablet form factor since 2001, but it was not successful and it took Jobs and the Apple design team to make it truly useable and marketable. It would be interesting to see the book updated to take into account this development, however the case history examined – that of the iPod – does provide a useful overview of the methods employed at Apple.

The leadership and management style employed by Jobs is analysed by Kahney. In addition to driving himself, Jobs was also a hard taskmaster to his staff expecting extremely high, and even impossible, standards. Jobs leadership style has been described as that of a ‘great intimidator’, achieving results through fear – and the book describes a number of examples where he harangued, and even ridiculed, staff over their performance. However, in addition to scaring his
staff witless, he could be charming and complimentary and had such a deep knowledge coupled to an overwhelming charisma which ensured that his staff deeply respected him and kept coming back for more. Anyone who has read a biography of Brian Clough will see parallels here. The book also examines some of the organisational development methods that Jobs employed, notably instilling and putting in considerable investment into a culture of personal and professional development in his employees, underlining the fact that Jobs was not just an ogre in the workplace. It would have been good to have read a detailed exploration of some of the personal interaction that Jobs has had over the years with key staff, notably his co-founder at Apple, Steve Wozniak and the legendary product designer Sir Jonathan Ive, but then again this book isn’t a comprehensive biography.

Overall, despite being a little light on biographical detail, this book provides a well written and very readable analysis of Steve Jobs’ business, management and leadership methods.
Many books have been written and nearly as much ink as blood spilt in analysing Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s airborne invasion of Holland, *Operation Market Garden*, mounted in September 1944. The operation was intended to seize a series of bridges, including the crucial Rhine-bridge at Arnhem, in order to open a direct route for the Allied armies into Germany, and with it the prospect of ending the war by Christmas 1944. Instead, as is well known, it ended in disaster and the effective destruction of the British 1st Airborne Division.

In this latest study, Dr Sebastian Ritchie sets out to demonstrate that there were and are a series of myths surrounding the Arnhem operation which have become established not only in the public consciousness, following Richard Attenborough’s brilliant feature film *A Bridge Too Far*, but far more dangerously are widely accepted by modern military historians and thus a generation of military officers, including airmen. He identifies three such myths for particular attention: first, that airborne warfare had proved a particularly effective method of warfare prior to *Market Garden*; second, that the operation was brilliantly conceived at the military-strategic level, but was ruined by flawed operational-tactical level failings; and third, and most enduring, that the senior airmen were most responsible for undermining the operation at this level. In particular it is often argued that their excessive caution both unnecessarily extended the timescale of the airborne lift, thus fatally delaying the deployment of 1st Airborne Division’s full combat power, and, equally culpably, resulted in the selection of landing zones located too far from the primary objective, the road bridge at Arnhem.

Dr Ritchie’s fine analytical study of the genesis, planning and execution of *Market Garden* effectively demolishes these myths. He argues convincingly that to understand the operation properly it is necessary to look at the history of both German and Allied airborne operations between 1940 and 1944: the former because they were very influential in the development of the latter, and because they help to illustrate the inherent characteristics of airborne warfare in this period as a whole. He shows that, contrary to received wisdom, nearly all such operations, German as well as Allied, were characterised by high casualty rates and frequent operational failure. Thus, *Market Garden* was not exceptional because it failed, far from it. Indeed, he also shows that where *Market Garden* was exceptional was in the very success of the airborne delivery, which put unprecedented numbers of troops and very large amounts of their equipment down intact and in the right place, a feat previously unheard of in Allied airborne landings. It was this accurate daylight delivery, courtesy of the Allied Air Forces, which allowed the airborne troops to secure the majority of their tactical objectives quickly.

As to the supposed brilliance of the overall concept the study effectively demolishes this myth as well, by showing that the operation was also seriously flawed at the military-strategic level, and that its shortcomings were entirely the
responsibility of Montgomery, who, very typically, not only conceived the operation for chauvinistic reasons, but aimed it at the Arnhem area and not the more achievable and strategically sensible Wesel area (which contained fewer water barriers) because he perceived that seizing a crossing in the latter area would be too close to the Americans and allow US troops to share the fruits of victory.

Beyond this, he establishes very clearly that the supposedly catastrophic interference of the airmen in the planning is a myth. In an operation that was entirely dependent on air power for its successful execution it was the soldiers who developed and planned the initial, very restrictive, concept, and who did so in isolation, deliberately excluding the air commanders until they could present the latter with a *fait accompli*, effectively demanding that they conform to the soldiers’ plan. The airmen were only informed of the decision to mount the operation and of its major objectives on 10 September, with an initial launch between 14 and 16 September, which allowed them only three days to arrange the airborne delivery of some 35000 troops and their equipment, together with all the requisite support operations, such as fighter escort and flak suppression, essential to a daylight drop. The operations involved three air transport formations (the RAF’s 38 and 46 Groups, and the USAAF’s IX Troop Carrier Command) together with escorts/flak suppression forces from the USAAF 8th Air Force Fighter Groups and the Air Defence of Great Britain (formerly Fighter Command), whilst air operations in direct support of the ground forces would have to be mounted by No 83 Group of 2nd Tactical Air Force from airfields on the continent. Little thought had been given by the soldiers to the enormous complexity of co-ordinating and de-conflicting such air operations. No 83 Group alone flew nearly 3000 sorties in support of *Market Garden*. Given the lack of time and the pre-ordained constraints under which they operated the air planners did a remarkable job.

Dr Ritchie also shows that the landing zones, about which there has been so much controversy, were initially agreed by senior Army officers during planning for an earlier (later aborted) airborne operation, that they fully accepted the RAF’s arguments regarding the DZ and LZ selection at this time, that in fact there were no feasible alternatives “closer to the bridge” as is often supposed, and that any attempt to mount a *coup de main* along the lines of the famous Pegasus Bridge operation in Normandy would almost certainly have failed. He also convincingly demonstrates that the airmen were right to refuse to attempt to mount two lifts on the first day of the operation which would supposedly have delivered more combat power into the battle zone on day one, thus allowing 1st Airborne to get more men to the Arnhem bridge. In actual fact, as a number of senior air planners predicted, the prevailing weather conditions, regularly witnessed both before and after 17 September and characterised by fog in the early morning hours, would not have permitted two lifts that day, irrespective of the very real air-related technical obstacles to such a plan. The airmen scheduled single daily lifts for late morning/early afternoon for good reason.

The *Market Garden* operation is a popular subject for RAF staff rides, and too many of the recent participants in these have been fed a diet of inaccurate and biased information which seriously distorts the achievements of air power in 1944, and worse erroneously suggests that it was the air commanders who contributed most to the operation’s failure. The presence of this book on the CAS Reading List will hopefully go a long way towards changing this perception. It should be compulsory reading for any staff ride contemplating a study of the Arnhem operations, and it would be no bad thing if every member of the Parachute Regiment was compelled to read it as well.
Contents of CAS’ Reading List 2008

By Dag Henriksen
Publisher: Naval Institute Press, Annapolis

John Warden and the Renaissance of American Air Power
By John Andreas Olsen
Publisher: Potomac Books, Inc., Washington

Strategy for Victory: The Development of British Tactical Air Power, 1919 – 1943
By David Ian Hall
Publisher: Praeger Security International, London

Divining Victory : Air Power in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah War
By William M Arkin
Publisher: Air University Press, Maxwell

Arms, Economics and British Strategy : From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs
By G.C. Peden
Publisher: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History
By Colin S. Gray,
Publisher: Routledge, London and New York

Just and Unjust Wars
By Michael Walzer
Publisher: Basic Books, New York

Politics and Propaganda : Weapons of Mass Seduction
By Nicholas Jackson O’Shaughnessy
Publisher: Manchester University Press, Manchester

“Bomber” Harris: His Life and Times
By Air Commodore Henry Probert
Publisher: Greenhill Books

The Royal Air Force Day by Day
By Air Commodore Graham Pitchfork
Publisher: Sutton Publishing
Contents of CAS’ Reading List 2009

**Constant Vigilance**
By Nigel Warwick
Publisher: Pen and Sword Aviation

**Understanding Modern Warfare**
By David Jordan, James D Kiras, David J Lonsdale, Ian Speller, Christopher Tuck, C Dale Walton
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

**Learning to eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam**
By John A Nagl
Publisher: Chicago University Press

**Air Power in Small Wars**
By James S Corum & Wray R Johnson
Publisher: University Press of Kansas

**Learning Large Lessons: The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post–Cold War Era**
By David E. Johnson
Publisher: RAND

**Dreams from My Father: A Story of Race and Inheritance**
By Barack Obama
Publisher: Cannongate Books

**Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq**
By Linda Robinson
Publisher: Public Affairs

**Swords and Ploughshares**
By Paddy Ashdown
Publisher: Weidenfeld & Nicolson

**Nemesis: The Battle for Japan, 1944-45**
By Max Hastings
Publisher: Harper Perennia

**The Past as Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession**
Edited by Williamson Murray and Richard Hart Sinnreich
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

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Contents of CAS’ Reading List 2010

A History of Air Warfare
By Olsen (ed)
Publisher: Potomac Books Inc

Sky Wars: A History of Military Aerospace Power
By David Gates
Publisher: Cambridge: Reaktion

The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States and War
By James S Corum & Wray R Johnson
Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Immediate Response
By Mark Hammond
Publisher: Michael Joseph, London

The Battle of Britain
By Richard Overy
Publisher: Penguin

War Since 1990
By Jeremy Black
Publisher: Social Affairs Unit

The Return of History and the End of Dreams
By Robert Kagan
Publisher: April 29, 2008

The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One
By David Kilcullen
Publisher: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, London

The International Politics of Space
By Michael Sheenan
Publisher: Routledge

Inside Cyber Warfare: Mapping the Cyber Underworld
By Jeffrey Carr
Publisher: O’Reilly
Contents of CAS’ Reading List 2011

Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies
By John Baylis, James Wirtz & Colin S. Gray (Eds)
Publisher: Oxford University Press

Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What To Do About It
By Richard Clarke & Robert Knake
Publisher: ECCO Press

Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare
By Charles Guthrie & Michael Quinlan
Publisher: Bloomsbury, London

The Secret State: Preparing for the Worst 1945-2010
By Peter Hennessy
Publisher: Penguin Books, London

The Battle of Britain: Five Months that Changed History, May - October 1940
By James Holland
Publisher: Bantam Press

7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century
By Andrew Krepinevich
Publisher: Bantam Press

Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes
By Patrick Porter
Publisher: Hurst & Company, London

Thinking about Nuclear Weapons
By Michael Quinlan
Publisher: Oxford University Press

Descent into Chaos
By Ahmed Rashid
Publisher: Penguin

Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century
By P W Singer
Publisher: Penguin
The views expressed by the reviewers in this list are theirs and theirs alone. Inclusion of a particular book within the reading list should not be taken to mean that the Royal Air Force or the Ministry of Defence endorses the contents. Manuscripts with challenging and even contrarian views will be included in order to stimulate thinking, discussion and debate.